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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 13-1114
_________________
YAN YAN LI,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A093-396-760)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Eugene Pugliese
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 3, 2013
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2013)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Yan Yan Li (“Li”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟
denial of her motion to reopen. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for
review.

I.
In 2008, Yan Yan Li appeared at a removal proceeding before an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”). Although Li did not contest the IJ‟s finding that she overstayed her visa in
violation of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), she sought withholding of removal on the basis of
China‟s family planning policy. The IJ found her testimony lacking in credibility and
ordered her removal to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed in
mid-2009. Due to attorney error, Li did not receive notice that her appeal was
unsuccessful. Upon her motion, the BIA reissued its decision in December 2010, and we
denied her subsequent petition for review in Li v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 432 F. App‟x
137 (3d Cir. 2011).
More than a year later, Li filed a counseled motion to reopen with the BIA. She
stated that she converted to Christianity in 2011, and that the Chinese government had
increased its persecution of members of unregistered Christian groups between 2008 and
2011. In denying her motion, the BIA found that Li‟s evidence neither demonstrated that
she will suffer persecution upon her return to China, nor established a change in country
conditions. Therefore, the BIA determined that Li lacked a basis for filing her motion to
reopen after the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen had passed. The BIA further
declined to exercise its authority to sua sponte reopen Li‟s proceedings. Through
counsel, Li filed a timely petition for review.1

1

We lack jurisdiction to review the portion of the BIA‟s decision that denied sua sponte
reopening. See Pllumi v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011).
2

II.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we review denials of motions to
reopen under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.2 See Sevoian v. Ashcroft,
290 F.3d 166, 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). “Discretionary decisions of the BIA will not be
disturbed unless they are found to be „arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.‟” Tipu v.
I.N.S., 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). A motion filed more than 90
days after the final decision of the BIA cannot be entertained unless it “is based upon
changed country conditions proved by evidence that is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” Pllumi v. Att‟y
Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011). A renewed asylum application based
on changes in personal circumstances filed outside of the 90-day window must be
accompanied by a motion to reopen that successfully shows changed country conditions.
Liu v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009).
Li does not dispute that her motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after the
BIA‟s final decision. Rather, Li asserts that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her
motion to reopen because it selectively considered the evidence to find that Li failed to
establish changed country conditions. We have stated that the BIA is required to
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Because we find that the BIA‟s decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,
we do not reach the BIA‟s alternative determination that Li did not establish a prima facie
case for asylum relief. See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 169-70 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating the BIA
may deny a motion to reopen in asylum cases where it determines that “the movant
would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief”) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 105 (1988)).
3

consider the evidence of changed country conditions presented by a party, and that the
BIA “should provide us with more than cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so
that we are able to discern its reasons for declining to afford relief to a petitioner.” Zheng
v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA,
437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)). But it need not “parse or refute on the record each
individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.” Id. Here, the BIA
reviewed, among other evidence that Li submitted, Li‟s baptism certificate, a letter from a
church in the United States, and excerpts from U.S. Department of State country and
International Religious Freedom reports, China Aid Association reports, and research
articles. The BIA then cited the 2009 U.S. Department of State country report on China,
and the 2009 and 2010 International Religious Freedom Reports to support its finding
that Li‟s evidence was inadequate to establish her eligibility for asylum or demonstrate
the existence of changed country conditions.3
To the extent that Li argues the BIA erred by failing to find the existence of
changed country conditions, we find that the BIA‟s determination was reasonable in light
of the evidence before it. The 2009 and 2010 International Religious Freedom Reports
establish that the practice of Christianity in China is restricted to those churches
registered with the government. In those years, leaders and members of unregistered
churches faced detention for activities related to their religious practice. The BIA
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We note that, as the BIA found, Li‟s conversion to Christianity constitutes a change in
personal circumstances rather than country conditions. See Liu, 555 F.3d at 150.
4

therefore reasonably concluded that Li did not establish changed country conditions
sufficient to justify an exception to the time and number limitations on filing a motion to
reopen.
After reviewing the record, it does not appear that the BIA‟s decision was
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for
review.

5

